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Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China
JEFFREY W. HORNUNG
Abstract: As China accumulates more power, Japan is often overlooked as being capable of
affecting China’s continued trajectory because of material differences and narratives of Japan
being a reactive state. Yet, Beijing’s strategic planning cannot ignore Tokyo because Japan has
the ability to affect the region’s security environment. Feeling its presence and influence becom-
ing relatively smaller, Tokyo has been increasingly proactive in its effort to expand its strategic
space and shape the regional environment in ways conducive to its interests. A review of Japan’s
approach to China since 1972 reveals that it has shifted away from its traditional engagement
policy toward first a soft hedge, followed by a harder hedge that continues to this day. Today’s
mix of partnerships and capabilities enable Japan to complicate China’s freedom of action and
frustrate its continued rise.
China has been rising for roughly three decades and, in the process, accumulating eco-
nomic, military, and political power. Consequently, its influence in the Asia-Pacific
region has expanded. This presents the region with both opportunities and challenges.
How states deal with China’s rise has therefore become a focus for both policymakers
and theorists of international relations. Because of an increasingly dangerous territo-
rial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese) and a growing geostrategic
rivalry that accompanies the “perils of proximity,” Japan’s response to China’s rise
deserves particular attention.1
Seeing Japan’s regional presence and influence become comparatively smaller as a
consequence of China’s rise, Japanese policymakers have increasingly wanted to push
back.2 And yet, despite having significant economic power, influential diplomatic pres-
ence, and modern military assets, Japan lacks superpower capabilities like those of the
United States (US). This matters because the US is often treated as the only state capa-
ble of affecting China’s rise.3 Moreover, Japan is on an opposite power trajectory than
China. Compared to Chinese average annual growth of 10.1% from 1990 to 2011, Japan
grew at 1.1%.4 This resulted in China’s GDP exploding from $357 billion to $7.3 tril-
lion compared to Japan’s creep from $3.1 trillion to $5.9 trillion.5 Future growth looks
bleak given Japan’s predicted population decline from 128 million in 2010 to nearly
87 million by 2060.6 Reflecting economic trends, Chinese defense spending grew 790%
compared to Japan’s 81%. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Chinese spending increased from $20 billion in 1990 to $158 billion in 2012,
while Japan’s barely moved from $48 billion to $59 billion.7 Although Japan’s military
is qualitatively superior to China’s, its advantage is eroding and, depending on spending
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98 Asian Security
patterns in both countries, it is questionable whether Japan can retain its advantage.8
Taken together, we would not expect Japan to be able to adversely affect China’s rise
despite a desire to do so.
Nor would we expect Japan to attempt to shape China’s rise. The dominant char-
acterization of postwar Japan has been a reactive state, unable to proactively shape
its environs.9 According to this logic, Japan fails to undertake independent initiatives
unless it is prodded by external pressure. Instead, Japan buck-passes, undertaking lim-
ited roles and relying on the US for its security.10 This leads to the conclusions that
Japan will not challenge China11 but instead stay in denial about China’s rise, “wishing
somehow it might go away.”12
Analyses of Japan’s approach to China varies. Some focus on Japan’s poli-
cies during distinct periods in response to specific events, thereby overemphasiz-
ing changes/continuity.13 Others focus purely on security policies, which place an
inordinate amount of attention on Japan’s military capabilities or its US alliance,
thereby missing developments in non-security, non–US spheres.14 Few works present
nuanced, inter-temporal analysis, but these suffer from age, failing to incorporate recent
changes.15 This article aims to fill the latter gap, addressing the questions: How has
Japan’s response to China’s rise changed, what explains these changes, and despite
expectations to the contrary, is Japan today capable of adversely affecting China’s con-
tinued rise? I will answer these questions by analyzing Japan’s China policy since 1972.
The article argues that in response to increasing Chinese assertiveness over the past few
decades, Japan’s approach toward China has evolved from a pure engagement policy
toward a soft hedge, followed by a harder hedge that continues today. This puts Japan
in a consequential position to complicate China’s freedom of action and frustrate its
continued rise.
After an overview of strategies to deal with rising powers, I examine Japan’s
approach to China. This analysis is focused on state-to-state relations and the per-
ception of state actors based on documents issued by the government of Japan (or
together with other states), as well as elite interviews conducted by the author. I cate-
gorize Japan’s approach to China into three periods, defined by the degree of Japan’s
engagement with and balancing of China. I argue that the evolution in Japan’s approach
is driven by Tokyo’s desire to be more proactive against what it perceives as increasing
Chinese assertiveness. From 1972 to 1996, Japan’s approach was purely engagement.
I then examine Japan’s policies from 1996 to 2010, arguing that Japan moved toward a
soft hedge. As evidence, I point to minimal efforts to externally hard balance with the
US, growing attempts to soft balance with Australia and India, and a tepid reduction
in economic ties with China. I then examine Japan’s policies since 2010, arguing that
Japan moved to a harder hedge. As evidence of this, I show Japan’s concerted efforts to
hard balance both internally and externally – including strengthening the US alliance
and enhancing security ties with Australia and India, unprecedented efforts at soft bal-
ancing via a rapid expansion in strategic ties with states throughout Southeast Asia and
Europe, and considerable reductions in economic ties with China in rare earths, for-
eign direct investment (FDI), and participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
In the final section, I argue that Japan’s actions have potentially harmful implications
for China’s continued rise and freedom of action.
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Strategies to Deal with Rising Powers
Arguably simplified, established states have a spectrum of strategies for dealing with
rising powers that include two extreme options (Figure 1).16 On one extreme, they
can balance to forge counter-veiling strength against the stronger or more threaten-
ing state.17 This can be pursued internally, whereby military capabilities are enhanced,
and/or externally, whereby alliances are initiated or enhanced to augment one’s military
capabilities. Because both focus on military capabilities, these are best characterized as
hard balancing. But states also pursue soft balancing, which focuses on strategic ties
and “the development of political alignments and. . .diplomatic initiatives” to balance
the influence of the rising state.18 At this end of the spectrum, because both strategies
emphasize competitive policies with the rising state rather than cooperative ones, we
would expect to see a serious commitment to contain or deter the rising power, either
by military means or strategic means. 19
Most scholarship treats bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing, where states
align with the rising power to neutralize or limit its threat.20 Essentially, bandwagoning
is a strategy of weak states that aims to ensure their security by conceding power to the
stronger state.21 This article treats engagement as the opposite.22 This is because Japan is
not considered a weak state or a state without a powerful ally, two factors that precon-
dition states to bandwagon.23 Engagement is the opposite of balancing because it relies
on cooperative policies and the promise of rewards, rather than the threat of force, to
ensure one’s security. As such, it makes conceptual sense to utilize engagement, which
is an option available to stronger states and relies on the non-coercive cultivation of ties
with the rising state to socialize it into the existing order and induce benign behavior.
At this end of the spectrum, for states pursuing engagement strategies, we would expect
to see a commitment to the promotion of exchanges (i.e., economic, diplomatic).
Between both extremes on the spectrum is the strategy of hedging.24 Hedging con-
sists of policies that stress both engagement and balancing.25 As such, it involves a mix
of cooperative and competitive policies. It seeks to induce benign behavior from the
rising state through the cultivation of cooperative ties while building up one’s capa-
bilities to prepare for the possibility that the rising state may harbor malign interests.
Importantly, it is a strategy available to both small and big powers.26 Hedging, how-
ever, is not monolithic. It is a multiple-component strategy measured by the degrees
of rejection and acceptance towards the stronger power.27 That which falls closer to
engagement – characterized as soft hedging – emphasizes cooperative policies that
cultivate ties with the rising power. As such, we would expect a heavier priority on poli-
cies promoting economic and diplomatic ties alongside a lesser priority on policies to
strengthen one’s military (internal or external) or strategic ties against the rising power.
Hedging that falls closer to balancing—characterized as hard hedging—emphasizes
FIGURE 1
SPECTRUMOF STRATEGIES
Soft Hedging Hard Hedging
Engagement Balancing
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100 Asian Security
competitive policies that augment one’s military capabilities and strategic alignments
with others. Here, we would expect a heavier priority on policies to strengthen one’s
military or strategic ties to protect oneself against the rising state concurrent with
a lesser priority on policies promoting economic and diplomatic ties with the rising
power.
Engagement
Japan’s traditional approach to China was engagement. With its primary security chal-
lenge emanating from the Soviet Union, from normalization of relations in 1972,
Japan avoided balancing efforts of China. This is because Japan’s security concerns
of China were highly limited given China’s restricted military capabilities.28 Instead,
Japan “focused on strengthening reform-minded leaders in China, assisting internal sta-
bilization, and re-establishing China as a key bilateral trading partner.”29 This meant a
concerted effort on deepening trade and providing Official Development Assistance
(ODA) in order to integrate China into the international system.
The result is a rapid rise in trade and ODA. Japan’s exports rose from187.5 billion
in 1972 to 1.2 trillion in 1989, while its imports rose from 263.8 billion in 1973 to
1.5 trillion in 1989 (Figure 2).30 Similarly, Japan’s ODA skyrocketed (Figure 3).31
Starting with $2 million in technical cooperation in 1979, by 1981, this jumped to
$13 million. The same year, Tokyo began providing $9 million in technical cooperation
and $15 million in loan aid. By 1989, this rose to $58 million in grants, $106 million in
technical cooperation, and $668 million in loans. The 1989 Tiananmen Square events
temporarily halted engagement, largely due to international pressure. Tokyo, however,
pushed for a rapid end to global China-sanctions because of domestic pressure from
its business community.32 Once lifted, Japan’s trade and ODA continued. By 1995,
Japanese exports totaled 2 trillion and imports totaled 3.4 trillion. ODA also grew,
reaching a $1.5 billion zenith in 1994. By 1995, Japan’s ODA totaled $83 million in
grants, $304 million in technical cooperation, and $992 million in loans.
FIGURE 2
JAPAN’S TRADEWITH CHINA (1972–2012)
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Source: Japan’s Ministry of Finance.
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FIGURE 3
JAPAN’S ODA TO CHINA (1979–2011)
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Toward a Soft Hedge
Tiananmen Square had an adverse effect, however, souring China’s image amongst the
Japanese public.33 Subsequent events continued to hurt its image, including the initia-
tion of a Patriotic Education Campaign in 1991 that reinforced anti-Japanese sentiment
and a 1992 law that allowed China to assert sovereignty over disputed territories. With
the Soviet Union no longer in existence, China’s 1995 nuclear tests and 1995–96 mili-
tary exercises near Taiwan proved to be the “wake-up call” for Japanese policymakers.34
The events of 1995–96 were interpreted by Tokyo as an indication of China’s growing
appetite to assert its power.35 This provoked Tokyo to alter its approach to China.
Consequently, over the next 14 years, Japan slowly moved away from engagement
as China became more assertive. Yet, while it maintained strong economic ties, Japan
showed constraint in its balancing efforts, indicative of a softer hedge.
Reflecting continued emphasis on engagement, trade grew, so much so that China
became Japan’s largest trading partner in 2007.36 By 2010, exports and imports each
totaled 13 trillion. Still hoping to ensconce China in international institutions, Japan
worked with China to establish the Chiang Mai Initiative and supported China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization. After a nadir in ties in the early 2000s due to both
sides posturing on historical issues, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe worked to repair rela-
tions under a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”37
His successors continued this, signing a joint resource development agreement in the
East China Sea (ECS) and a joint statement on their mutually beneficial relationship.38
The Democratic Party of Japan administration’s first premier Yukio Hatoyama even
desired to turn East Asia into a “lake of fraternity” that included China.39
Yet, China’s behavior sparked debates in Tokyo about whether engagement was
inducing benign behavior. This included increased Chinese activity in the airspace and
waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, submerged submarines in territorial waters,
naval vessels passing through the Tsugaru Strait, and ship-borne helicopters buzzing
Japanese vessels. From the mid-1990s onward, internal debates over engagement
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intensified and, over time, Japanese bureaucrats and lawmakers who saw China as
assertive started to outweigh those who favored accommodation.40 With Japan’s eco-
nomic stagnation, assistance to China was criticized, resulting in wide fluctuations in
ODA (Figure 3).41 By early 2005, Tokyo decided to terminate its yen loans to coincide
with the Beijing Olympics. Although grant aid and technical cooperation continued,
Tokyo stopped the issuance of new loans in 2007 and began to reduce grants, signifying
a small step away from engagement.
Indicative of a softer hedge, Japan’s internal balancing was limited and external bal-
ancing constrained. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) kept defense spending virtually
flat, reduced Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel and the number of aircraft
and destroyers, retired old equipment, made modest frontline equipment upgrades, and
gave little focus to defending offshore islands.42 At the same time, because of increas-
ing Chinese regional influence and a desire to “make China behave” (as well as North
Korea), Japan needed to strengthen relations with the US.43 As such, Tokyo began
some enhancements to its US alliance. The allies explicitly referred to China for the first
time in a 1996 declaration, followed by new defense guidelines in 1997 which included
language committing Japanese rear-area support for the US in “situations in areas sur-
rounding Japan.”44 Additionally, they initiated the Defense Policy Review Initiative
to enhance US power projection from bases in Japan to respond to regional threats.
Realignment of US forces in Japan was integral to this, but politics in Okinawa pre-
ventedmovement on a core element to realignment:Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Japan also agreed to a joint research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) and closely
aligned its foreign policies to the US, including the war on terror.
Tokyo also began to focus on limited soft balancing. The strategy thrived under the
concept of “values diplomacy,” which involved an emphasis on “universal values” such
as democracy, freedom, and human rights.45 This meant targeting countries along an
“arc of freedom and prosperity” that Japan believed shared similar values and interests.
The nature of this invariably excluded China. Yet, according to a former diplomat,
“nobody was fooled” by the strategy, “everyone knew [it was] driven by China.”46
This was because, by the mid-2000s, Tokyo was increasingly anxious over Beijing’s
opaque military modernization and maritime activities and the threat these posed to
Japan’s territorial integrity and relative regional standing.
Specifically, Japan targeted Australia and India. With Japan’s strategic space under
pressure, policymakers increasingly viewed these democracies through a China prism,
therefore desiring strategic alignment with both. Australia’s alliance with the US
appealed to Japan. Because the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) cannot regularly
operate outside the ECS, Tokyo looked to India to ensure Japanese vessels safe passage,
whether from pirates or Chinese ships, from the Malacca Strait to the Persian Gulf.47
But each of these relationships developed differently.
Prior to the mid-2000s, Tokyo-Canberra security ties were limited to cooper-
ation within multinational operations. This included Cambodia, Timor-Leste, the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief efforts, and Iraq. Australia’s motivations for
closer Japanese ties came from its growing strategic interest in East Asia, which
included its desire to fight piracy, nuclear proliferation, and promote inclusive
regional institutions.48 As part of this, Japan became strategically significant.49 By the
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Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China 103
mid-2000s, however, despite statements by Australian officials that closer ties were not
aimed at China,50 Canberra’s anxiety started to surface. This was apparent in Australia’s
2007 Defense Update that stated the pace and scope of China’s military expansion
risked regional instability.”51 Similarly, its 2009 White Paper warned “the pace, scope
and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors
cause for concern.”52
The growing China anxiety helped Japan’s push for closer strategic ties. After
broadening ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship in 2006,53 they signed the
2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.54 It was unprecedented in that it
was Japan’s first security cooperation agreement with a country other than the US.
It not only provided structure to various lines of interaction, it established a regular
2+2 Dialogue between their Foreign and Defense Ministers, which was Japan’s first
non-US and Australia’s third (after the US and UK). A subsequent action plan outlined
specific means for implementing the Joint Declaration, including discussions between
the Australia Customs and Japan Coast Guard (JCG) on joint exercises, personnel
exchanges, and training opportunities.55
This set the stage for growth. In June 2008, they elevated ties to a Comprehensive
Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership.56 That December, they initiated discus-
sions on an information security agreement (ISA) and, for the first time, explicitly stated
the importance of open sea lines of communication (SLOCs).57 Moreover, they revised
a 2003 Memorandum on Defense Exchange to further develop military ties by promot-
ing high level exchanges (i.e., defense ministers, SDF-Australian Defense Force chiefs
of staff, and chiefs of staff of individual services); working level exchanges; and unit-
to-unit exchanges.58 In May 2010 they broke new ground by signing an Acquisition
and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) – Japan’s first beyond the US – establishing a
framework for providing supplies and services (i.e., not weapons or ammunition).59
Concurrent with these efforts, Tokyo reached out to New Delhi. India priori-
tized closer ties with Japan as part of its Look East strategy.60 But because of India’s
1998 nuclear test, closer ties had to wait. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks in
the US, they pledged to cooperate on regional security issues such as terrorism, nuclear
non-proliferation, and the security of maritime traffic.61
Yet, like Australia, while not initially motivated by China, India started to view
China with anxiety because the strategic gap with China was increasing.62 Not only did
China expand its naval capacities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, but India also
found itself contending more with Chinese support of a nuclear Pakistan.63 Because
its navy’s power projection is limited to the Indian Ocean, it prefers to work with
countries like Japan to maintain regional stability. New Delhi also recognized areas for
improvement in its navy that Japan can provide (i.e., anti-submarine warfare, mine-
counter measures, and board, search, and seize operations).64
This enabled Japan to pursue strategic ties. In 2005, they agreed to enhance
security dialogue and cooperation that included annual summits, regular dialogue in
security and defense fields, strengthened service-to-service exchanges, closer coop-
eration between coast guards and maritime agencies, and, for the first time, naval
exchanges.65 The following year, they agreed to hold regular defense minister meetings,
Defense Policy Dialogues (Defense Secretary/Administrative Vice Minister level),
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and exchanges of Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff level, staff level of each service, and naval
ship visits.66 All these resulted in stronger strategic ties. Their relationship evolved in
2006 when they elevated ties to a Strategic and Global Partnership.67 Included in this
was the institutionalization of Strategic Dialogue (Foreign Ministers level) and regular
Policy Dialogue (National Security Advisor of India and Japanese counterpart); an
agreement to enhance maritime cooperation via capacity building, technical assistance,
and information sharing; regular coast guard exchanges and combined exercises; and
an agreement to undertake a naval exercise (Japan’s inaugural participation in Malabar
exercises occurred in September 2007). The forward momentum culminated with a
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008.68 Tamer than the Japan-Australian
counterpart, it nevertheless signaled a desire for coordinated responses to issues and
delineated the expanding number of mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation.69
Further strengthening followed. In 2009, they inaugurated a Maritime Security
Dialogue, resolved to strengthen bilateral military exercises,70 and adopted a detailed
action plan identifying nine areas of cooperation based on the joint declaration.71 This
included exercises, exchanges, and training on issues such as anti-piracy, military coop-
eration in anti-piracy activities, and joint coast guard exercises. They also agreed to an
annual Strategic Dialogue and Defense Policy Dialogue and establish a 2+2 Dialogue
(Foreign Ministry + Defense Ministry subcabinet/senior officials). Importantly, they
agreed to hold annual bilateral naval exercises and participate as observers in major
army and air force exercises.
Viewing the changes from 1996–2010 in their totality, Japan pulled away from its
traditional engagement policy as a response to increasing assertiveness by China. It cut
China-bound ODA, enhanced hard balancing efforts with the US, and pursued soft
balancing with Australia and India to increase their strategic ties. Yet, demonstrating
an emphasis on engagement, trade continued rising, external hard and soft balancing
was limited, and Japan forwent internal hard balancing. Given the absence of concerted
hard or soft balancing and the priority on continued engagement, Japan’s approach to
China during this period is best characterized as soft hedging.
Towards a Harder Hedge
Like the previous period, increasing Chinese assertiveness preceded Japan’s next evo-
lution. This included Beijing’s decision to unilaterally drill for gas in the ECS despite
a joint cooperation agreement, expanded maritime patrols in and around the waters of
the Senkaku Islands, and naval vessels shadowing the maritime patrols and circumvent-
ing Japan. For Tokyo, the turning point came on September 7, 2010 when the Chinese
fishing trawlerMinjinyu 5179 collided with two JCG vessels. Following Japan’s arrest
of the captain, Beijing cancelled official meetings and cultural exchanges, demanded
apologies and compensation for holding the captain, and repeatedly summoned Japan’s
ambassador to protest (including the early morning hours). Additionally, Beijing ceased
Japan-bound rare earths’ exports and subjected Japanese imports to lengthy customs
inspections.
Alarm bells sounded in Tokyo. Throughout the 2000s, Japanese leaders had been
suspicious of Chinese military spending because of the lack of transparency. Still, they
favored engagement policies under the assumption they would encourage Beijing to
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become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Tokyo could live with
opaqueness as long as Beijing followed that assumption. The collision was the final
straw, with policymakers feeling that “we won’t take it anymore.”72 It forced policy-
makers “to look at the reality of China.”73 One policymaker described the event as
demonstrating that China was nothing but a “big bully.”74 In fact, the 2010 collision
triggered a pervasive view amongst officials throughout Tokyo that Japan “has been
pushed enough and too long” by China.75 This resulted in another shift in Japan’s
approach to China, this time toward a harder hedge. Although serious thought began
after the collision, most changes had to wait until after the March 11, 2011 disasters.
Consequently, these efforts began under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and continue
under his successor Shinzo Abe.
Hard Balancing: Internal
Changes in Japan’s defense posture began with revisions to the National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010. Under the notion of “dynamic
defense force,” policy shifted from Japan’s traditional passive deterrent “basic defense
force” to one focused on “readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatil-
ity.”76 The NDPG also shifted focus away from Cold War-era concerns of a northern
invasion to protecting Japan’s southwestern islands, which currently suffer “a vac-
uum of force.”77 Abe revised the NDPG in 2013, but maintained the focus of the
2010 document while emphasizing the jointness of forces under the notion of “dynamic
joint defense force.” Importantly, Abe increased defense spending for the first time in
11 years (0.8%) for 2013 and the biggest increase in 22 years for 2014 (2.8%). The
changes these documents initiated require enhancements in intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and island defenses that the
increased defense spending supports.78
Tokyo is focusing heavily on ISR improvements. The MOD allocated money to
develop a fixed-air defense radar on Okino Erabu Island with FPS-7 and convert the
existing defense radar on Miyako and Takahatayama Islands to the same system.79
Similarly, to provide visibility of Japan’s farthest point – Yonaguni Island – the MOD
developed plans to deploy a mobile 3D radar device and coast surveillance unit for early
detection of ships and aircraft. In an effort to improve air capabilities, theMOD seeks to
convert the central computing device and install electronic warfare support measures in
the Air Self-Defence Force’s (ASDF) E-767s, develop a servicing foundation for E-2Cs
at Naha Air Base to ensure continuous aerial surveillance, and acquire three unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV).
Tokyo also is improving ASW capabilities. The most visible aspect is two new
19,500-ton helicopter destroyers (DDH) (the first, Izumo, will be commissioned in
2015) and the acquisition of P-1s as the successor to Japan’s P-3Cs. Izumo is Japan’s
largest ship, capable of carrying 14 helicopters, thereby increasing surveillance capa-
bilities. P-1s, with improved flight performance, advance the MSDF’s capabilities
in submarine detection and identification, information processing, and striking. The
MSDF is also set to acquire two new types of helicopters: the MCH-101 minesweeping
helicopter (with tow radars enabling submarine searches) and the SH-60K patrol
helicopter (designed for transport on ships like Izumo).80 Additionally, the MSDF
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is acquiring new technology to improve its ability to find submarines and enable its
submarines to avoid detection.
Tokyo is also improving the SDF’s ability to defend outlying islands and the airspace
and waters surrounding Japan and rapidly respond to contingencies. For the MSDF,
this includes new Aegis destroyers and Soryu-class submarines with enhanced X-band
satellite communications capabilities and torpedo countermeasures. New weapons are
also being developed to improve lethality. This includes a ship-to-ship missile with
improved guidance precision and extended range as a successor to the Type-90 missile
and a new generation submarine-launched torpedo to upgrade the existing Type-
89 heavy weight torpedo as a means to respond to advancements in torpedo deception
devices and declined sensor detection range. The ASDF is set to acquire stealth F-35A
fighters, improve the defense capabilities of existing F-15s, improve air-to-air combat
capabilities of existing F-2s, and add Joint Direct Attack Munitions functions to F-
2s, thereby increasing munitions accuracy. Additionally, the MOD increased fighter
squadrons at Naha Air Base from one to two. Finally, in addition to considering
deploying units to outlying islands, the GSDF is acquiring new mobile missile sys-
tems to defend against foreign assets in territorial waters and airspace. This includes
the Type-11 short-range missile to defend against aerial attacks and the Type-12 and
improved Type-88 surface to ship missiles to defend against sea attacks.
Because these islands are separated by water, the ability to move troops is cru-
cial, including retaking captured islands. This necessitated the acquisition of CH-47JA
helicopters, US-2 rescue amphibian seaplanes, a next-generation rescue helicopter to
replace the UH-60J, and Type-96 armored personnel carriers that can operate on land
with poor infrastructure. Additionally, the MOD ordered 17 MV-22 tilt-rotor air-
craft that can be operated from the DDH. The biggest change is the establishment of
an amphibious unit in the GSDF’s Western Army Infantry Regiment—charged with
defending these islands. By 2015, a 3,000-strong unit is expected.81 This growing force
has already conducted field-training exercises with the US Marine Corps and is set to
obtain 52 amphibious assault vehicles over the coming years.
Hard Balancing: External
Concurrent with Japan’s robust internal hard balancing is its significant external hard
balancing with the US. This is fortuitous given increased US interest in the Asia-Pacific
under its rebalance strategy and Japan’s special place in the strategy.82 Capitalizing on
a shared interest in stronger relations, the allies have dramatically upgraded security
ties. To enhance interoperability, readiness, and decision making, they have pursued a
number of joint efforts. This includes a joint air defense headquarters at Yokota Air
Base, a joint headquarters for the US Army and GSDF at Camp Zama, joint/shared use
of facilities, and joint training and exercises. Tokyo also made progress toward resolv-
ing the Futenma relocation issue, thereby ensuring a more politically sustainable US
presence in Okinawa.83
To meet a list of security concerns that now explicitly includes China, the allies
aimed to upgrade their alliance in October 2013.84 This included enhancing their BMD
capabilities through the deployment to Japan of a second X-Band radar system and
more advanced US assets that include MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol
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aircraft, F-35B fighter jets, and the Global Hawk UAV.85 The allies also agreed to
cooperate in fields in which China is increasingly active, notably cyber and space.
Most significant are plans to revise the 1997 defense guidelines as a response to China’s
increasing military power.86 Revisions are expected to expand their roles and missions
and strengthen jointness.
Japan is also taking primordial steps toward hard balancing with Australia and India
alongside continued soft balancing efforts. Noda focused Japan’s relationship with
Australia to China’s rise and stronger ties.87 His government concluded an Information
Security Agreement with Canberra, laying the framework for information sharing.88
Importantly, in September 2012, their foreign and defense ministers explicitly referred
to cooperation in the scope of China for the first time.89 While they agreed to cooperate
on supporting China’s “responsible and constructive participation in the international
rules-based order” and encourage “improved openness and transparency with respect
to China’s military modernization and activities,” like Japan–US ties, they expanded
cooperation into fields in which China has increasingly become active, including cyber,
space, and capacity building in the South China Sea (SCS) and Pacific Islands. Abe
continues this. Their governments held talks that included discussions on the ECS
and relations with China90 and agreed to collaborate on issues surrounding the SCS.91
Significantly, they completed their domestic procedures to enter into force the ACSA
(January 2013) and ISA (March 2013), both necessary for operational defense coop-
eration, and are negotiating Japan’s provision of advanced submarine technology to
Australia. Australia today views Japan as its “best friend in Asia.”92
Relations with India have also grown. Apart from a new Cyber Dialogue and
Maritime Affairs Dialogue, there were reports in November 2012 that Singh and Noda
would start bilateral discussions on the SCS.93 Because their summit was cancelled,
however, this went unrealized. In November 2011, their Defense Ministers agreed to
items to realize in 2012, including a bilateral navy exercise, army staff talks, and air force
staff exchanges.94 The bilateral exercise – their first – was held in Japan’s Sagami Bay
with the aim to improve the tactical combat skills of the MSDF and promote defense
cooperation and exchange with the Indian Navy.95 In May 2013, in line with Singh’s
desire to grow defense and security dialogue, military exercises, and defense technology
collaboration with Japan,96 Abe and Singh agreed to a joint working group to supply
India with 15 of Japan’s US-2 amphibious seaplanes and to conduct bilateral naval exer-
cises on a regular basis with increased frequency.97 In a further sign of deepening ties, in
January 2014, they agreed to strengthen defense cooperation, launch regular consulta-
tions between national security advisors, and hold more bilateral naval and coast guard
exercises.98
Soft Balancing
At the same time that Japan hard balances (both externally and internally), the MOD
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have made concerted soft balancing efforts
with countries that share concerns regarding China, particularly maritime and sea pow-
ers.99 Like previous efforts with Australia and India, Japan’s aim is to develop closer
strategic ties.
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Japan’s efforts have focused on Southeast Asia, where countries are embroiled in
territorial disputes with China, in particular Vietnam and the Philippines, two coun-
tries policymakers felt shared similar security concerns with China.100 But Japan is
strengthening strategic ties with states throughout the world, increasing its leverage to
“push China” toward more acceptable behavior.101
Security issues were not a focus for Tokyo-Manila ties until after the 2010 col-
lision.102 After becoming premier, Noda elevated ties to a Strategic Partnership,
understanding Manila’s increasing China concerns. They agreed to common strategic
interests (like SLOC safety) and to regularize summit/ministerial meetings, con-
vene multilayered policy dialogues, strengthen bilateral cooperation between maritime
safety and defense authorities, and enhance coordination between all maritime safety
authorities.103 In 2013, they agreed to further deepen their Strategic Partnership, bolster
maritime cooperation, and work closer together to address increasing security chal-
lenges.104 By July 2013, Abe unveiled a plan to provide Manila with ten patrol ships
and agreed to various security exchanges and cooperation initiatives.105 The ships,
part of Japan’s capacity building efforts, represent a change from its previous focus
on dispatching personnel to the Philippine Coast Guard to engage in education and
training.106
Relations with Vietnam followed a similar trajectory. Despite Abe’s first admin-
istration elevating their relationship to a Strategic Partnership, their focus remained
on non-security issues.107 This changed in 2010 when they agreed to launch a regular
2+2 Dialogue between their vice-foreign ministers and defense director-generals.108 In
2011 Noda and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung issued a joint statement with shared
strategic interests and agreed to strengthen their strategic dialogue.109 Agreeing on the
importance of close ties in dealing with China, their defense ministers signed a mem-
orandum to enhance cooperation by agreeing to regular defense vice-ministerial-level
talks, ministerial visits, and military exchanges.110 Abe continues this, agreeing with
Dung to further advance their Strategic Partnership, strengthen cooperative ties, and
begin talks on providing patrol ships to Vietnam’s Coast Guard.111
Japanese efforts with other Southeast Asian countries followed. With Singapore,
before 2010, cooperation was limited to anti-piracy efforts. Then, following China’s
assertiveness, Singapore and Japan held dialogues to discuss regional and global issues
relating to maritime security, such as freedom of navigation.112 Singapore’s primary
concern is maintaining free and stable SLOCs. With Japan saying it wants to play an
active role in regional peace, Singapore expressing hope for Japan’s leadership,113 and
leaders in both countries agreeing to strengthen cooperation in various fields (includ-
ing security),114 Chinese behavior that threatens SLOCs will drive Singapore and Japan
closer together.
The same pattern is found in Japan’s relationships with Indonesia and Thailand.
Although Japan-Indonesia ties were characterized as a Strategic Partnership in 2006,
their focus remained on piracy and disaster management.115 This was the logic behind
Japan’s donation of three patrol ships in 2007.116 It is also behind Japan’s capacity build-
ing efforts to strengthen Indonesia’s maritime capabilities.117 But following Chinese
assertiveness in the SCS, Tokyo and Jakarta began holding ministerial-level discus-
sions (i.e., Strategic Dialogue; Defense Ministers’ Dialogue) and agreed to increase
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cooperation between defense authorities.118 By late 2013, they agreed to further
strengthen their strategic partnership and communications between their foreign and
defense authorities.119 And while Japan’s Strategic Partnership with Thailand only
began in 2012, Noda and his counterpart Yingluck Shinawatra committed themselves
to address bilateral, regional and international issues, including maritime security and
maritime safety.120 Relations continue to deepen under Abe. He and Shinawatra have
discussed cooperation on SCS issues,121 recognized the need to further advance their
strategic partnership,122 and agreed to strengthen security cooperation, including joint
training between their militaries.123
Japan is also focusing on Europe. Noda’s decision to relax Japan’s ban on the joint
development or production of defense equipment with others opened up one avenue
for cooperation. Four months after his decision, Japan signed a Defense Cooperation
Memorandum with Britain over the joint development of weapons and came together
in various security areas, including a Foreign Minister-led Strategic Dialogue, initiating
negotiations on an ISA, and the exploration of joint exercises and training.124 Abe’s
government signed a Defense Equipment Cooperation Framework and an ISA.125 Abe
also strengthened ties with France, recognizing its importance in the Pacific. During
a summit with President Francois Hollande, they agreed to establish a Minister-level
2+2 Dialogue, create a forum to deliberate export controls of civilian items with mili-
tary applications, and discuss joint development of defense equipment.126 These efforts
are expected to continue given Abe’s desire for Britain and France “to stage a comeback
in terms of participating in strengthening Asia’s security.”127
These relationships are reinforced by stronger Japan-NATO ties. Although this
relationship is not new,128 Abe broke new ground by signing a joint political declara-
tion delineating shared strategic interests in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity
through a rules-based international order.129 This includes areas where China is active,
such as cyber and maritime security. Because these are areas of concern for Japan and
because NATO views stability in the Asia-Pacific region as important, the potential
exists for more cooperation in Asia.130
Tokyo is leveraging these new strategic ties to create a unified understanding on rules
regulating the maritime domain. Since 2010, as a response to China’s excessive claims
in the SCS based on Beijing’s interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), Japan has vigorously promoted legal interpretations of maritime law
based on its interpretation of UNCLOS. This despite the fact Japan does not have any
territorial claims in the SCS. The result is a strengthening regional legal interpretation
of the maritime domain different from China’s. Given growing ties with Canberra and
New Delhi, it is no surprise to see UNCLOS emerge in bilateral documents. In Joint
Statements or 2+2 Dialogues, Noda’s government pushed for references to universally
agreed-upon principles of international law, including UNCLOS.131 Abe continues
this.132 Importantly, both premiers have vigorously pushed for similar language with
new partners.
This first appeared in a September 2011 Joint Statement with the Philippines, where
the peace and stability of the SCS is said to be vital to both.133 In it, they agreed
on the importance of protecting “freedom of navigation . . . and compliance with
established international law including the UNCLOS.” A month later, when Noda
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Y
on
se
i U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
4:5
0 0
3 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
110 Asian Security
met Vietnamese Premier Dung, they agreed verbatim to the Japan-Philippine Joint
Statement. Going one step further, they “welcomed the adoption of the Guidelines
for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC)” and called for its full implementation and “the early formulation of
a Code of Conduct (COC) in accordance with established international law.”134 Abe’s
government continues these efforts.135 In what is perhaps the most explicit, public cri-
tique of China, Abe and Dung agreed to “oppose changing the status quo with force in
the South China Sea and that the rule of law, including related international laws, was
essential.”136
Similar language has emerged in documents with other Southeast Asia partners. The
2012 joint statement with Thailand stipulates that promotion and deepening of coop-
eration on maritime issues would be in accordance with universally agreed principles
of international law, including UNCLOS.137 Abe explicitly tied Japan to the SCS by
telling his Thai counterpart that the SCS was a common concern to all.138 Despite
UNCLOS not appearing in official documents, whenNodamet with Indonesia’s Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono in June 2012, they identified the SCS as a matter of common
interest and that all countries concerned should comply with international law.139 When
Abe met him in 2013, they agreed on the importance of international laws, including
UNCLOS.140 When Noda met Singapore’s Premier Lee Hsien Loong in November
2011, they agreed on the need to adhere to international law and UNCLOS.141 They
reiterated this in September 2012, agreeing the SCS was a concern for the international
community and that it was important to observe international laws like UNCLOS.142
Abe and Lee have agreed on the importance of settling the SCS dispute peacefully on
the basis of international law, like UNCLOS.143
Japan has even expanded these efforts multilaterally. At the November 2011 Japan-
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting, the leaders
released the Bali Document, their first joint declaration since 2003.144 In it, maritime
security emerged as a means to strengthen cooperation and they agreed, for the first
time, to deepen cooperation “in accordance with universally agreed principles of inter-
national law such as freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, unimpeded commerce
and peaceful settlement of disputes, including the 1982 UNCLOS and other relevant
international maritime law.” Additionally, the document used language verbatim to
Japan’s Vietnam statement regarding the DOC and the hope for the conclusion of a
COC so as to contribute to “safety of navigation in and over-flight above the South
China Sea, with adherence to international law.” During the subsequent East Asian
Summit (EAS) meeting, Noda advocated SCS discussion, pressing claimant states to
seek a peaceful resolution “based on international law”145 and proposed creating an
East Asia maritime security forum where officials and experts can meet to discuss
and establish Asia’s maritime order.146 Abe continues these efforts with the ASEAN,
not only securing reference to UNCLOS, but rallying support to criticize China’s
November 2013 unilateral establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in a
joint statement of a special ASEAN-Japan commemorative summit.147
Japan’s efforts have also expanded to Oceania where, since 1997, Japan hosts
the Pacific Islands Leaders Meetings (PALM) every three years. Previous meetings
focused on issues like fisheries, human security, environment and climate change, and
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sustainable development, but Japan crafted two changes in the 2012 iteration (PALM
6) in reaction to China’s increased regional clout. The first was putting maritime issues
on the agenda for the first time, “recognizing the role of international law for the main-
tenance of peace and security in the Pacific Ocean” and underlying the importance of
UNCLOS for maritime order.148 The second was getting the US involved.149 Both are
important for Japan because China has become increasingly active in the Pacific Islands,
expanding its economic influence and securing natural resources. Japanese diplomats
see the region as split into a pro-US sphere and a pro-China sphere.150 Japan’s PALM
6 efforts therefore intended to send a message to China that it cannot operate freely in
the region.
Reduced Engagement
Importantly, in addition to the concerted hard and soft balancing efforts, Japan has
begun to reduce its economic ties with China, further indication of its move toward
a harder hedge. While trade remains robust (Figure 2), the percentage of Japan’s total
exports to China has fallen from 19.4% in 2010 to 18.1% in 2012, while ASEAN’s
has risen from 14.6% to 16.2%.151 China has also fallen as the most popular pro-
duction site for Japanese companies, overtaken by ASEAN countries.152 Importantly,
since 2010, Japan’s FDI into China has been superseded by an acceleration of FDI into
ASEAN,making ASEAN the secondmost common destination for Japanese FDI (after
the EU).153 Nowhere is Japan’s shift away from engagement more prevalent than the
rare earths trade. China holds a near monopoly, producing over 95% of the world’s
supply.154 From 2000 until 2009, Japan’s reliance on China never fell below 85% (see
Figure 4).155 This made Japan extremely vulnerable. After the 2010 collision, Beijing
suspended Japan-bound exports.156 This lasted until November, partially explaining
the sudden drop to 75.13% in the remaining three months of 2010.
FIGURE 4
PERCENTAGE OF JAPAN’S RARE EARTHS IMPORTS FROM CHINA (2000–12)
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Source: Zaimusho Boueki Toukei (Japan’s Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics Database).
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Immediately, Japan reduced its reliance on China. In 2011, the percentage of Japan’s
rare earths from China fell to 66.67%. In 2012, it fell to 56.06%. Imports from France,
Vietnam, and Estonia rapidly rose (Figure 5).157 If continued, this reduction is on track
to meet the stated goal of then-Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Yukio Edano
in November 2012 that Japan would reduce its reliance on China to 50% by 2013.
This was possible because of Japanese efforts. Starting in November 2010, Tokyo
and private Japanese companies set out to secure supplies by signing long-term agree-
ments with companies in Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Australia, and India. The Indian
agreement alone promises to supply roughly 10–15% of Japan’s demand.158 Japan is
also seeking partnerships with companies in Myanmar, Mongolia, Canada, Brazil, and
Serbia. Japan has also launched projects to develop technologies for recycling rare-earth
elements from used high-tech components and develop materials to use as substitutes.
Both efforts promise to reduce China’s market influence.
Japan is also seeking to shape China’s trade behavior through the TPP. In November
2011, Noda expressed an interest in joining but, due to strong resistance from his party,
did not join. Yet, this enabled Abe to declare Japan’s entry, stressing “If we miss this
opportunity, it would immediately mean that we would be left out of setting global
regulations” on free trade.”159 While there is an economic rationale for joining that
includes the advancement of structural reforms of some industries (i.e., agriculture)
and avoiding marginalization from trade agreements being concluded by its neighbors,
China dominates Japan’s motivation.160 According to Abe’s National Security Advisor
Shotaro Yachi, Japanese policymakers see the TPP as a chance to set the rules that will
bind trade to aid Japan at a time when China’s economy appears unable to join.161 The
TPP is a means to shape China’s rise in a way beneficial to Japan, specifically, to encour-
age China to abide by the regional order under which Japan prospers.162 Noda’s special
advisor, Akihisa Nagashima, believed the TPP would “create a strategic environment
where China would see Japan as a formidable neighbor that cannot be pushed around”
and through creating trade rules, “Japan and the US will foster order” that China will
have to abide.163
FIGURE 5
PERCENTAGE OF JAPAN’S RARE EARTHS IMPORTS WITHOUT CHINA (2000–12)
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Taken together, post-2010 changes indicate a further evolution in Japan’s approach
to China. Concurrent with significant external hard balancing with the US and
primordial efforts with Australia and India, Japan pursued concerted internal hard bal-
ancing and significant soft balancing throughout Southeast Asia, Europe, and Oceania.
Importantly, Japan has forgone efforts to deepen economic ties with China and instead
began to withdraw or challenge it. Japan’s approach during this period is therefore best
characterized as hard hedging.
Possible Implications for China
Despite the expectation that Japan cannot affect China’s rise, Beijing cannot ignore
Tokyo’s hard hedge. Japan’s ability to affect China comes from the latter’s need for a
stable international environment for continued development. Part of this is convincing
others that it will not bully its way while it rises. In other words, that China follows the
path of “peaceful development.”164 If China’s neighbors believe otherwise, and increas-
ingly unify behind this concern, the regional environment will not be conducive to
China’s rise. This is why Beijing embarked on a charm offensive to change its image
abroad “from threat to opportunity, from danger to benefactor.”165 Essentially, to por-
tray itself as “a benign, peaceful, and constructive actor.”166 Around 2008, however,
this changed. Chinese military and maritime assets increasingly harassed ships and air-
craft near territory it claims in the SCS and ECS. China also revived its claim to the
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, designated the SCS as a “core national interest” and
pressured ASEAN states to sever informal relations with Taiwan.167 Concurrently, it
actively targeted Japan, as outlined above. While scholars debate whether this behavior
represents new assertiveness, regional actors confronting it perceived it as such.168 This
provided fertile ground for Tokyo to proactively establish new strategic ties, strengthen
existing security ties, and build up its own military.
Japan’s four-decade evolution arriving at today’s harder hedge impacts all dimen-
sions of China’s rise, making it very much a consequential power.169 Economically,
Japan’s reduced engagement hurts China. The push to dilute China’s rare earths
monopoly and reduce its China-bound trade and FDI strips crucial development
resources from China that it requires. Instead, these are being directed to ASEAN
economies. The TPP is perhaps more critical as it not only sets rules that will benefit
Japan, but Japan’s participation increases the TPP’s significance, providing crucial cen-
trifugal force necessary to pull in other economies and thereby diminish the importance
of the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Diplomatically, Japan’s growing strategic relationships throughout Asia and Europe
give it more partners with shared strategic interests. The growth in high-level meetings
provides Japanese policymakers platforms to engage and possibly shape their counter-
parts’ China policies. For example, during his summit with President Hollande, Abe
pushed France to cease exporting dual-use items to China that could improve the
PLA’s capabilities.170 While Hollande opposed Abe’s effort, it demonstrated Japan’s
willingness to advance its own interests and how, if successful, it could harm China.
Japan’s closer strategic ties can potentially check Beijing’s ambitions at regional lead-
ership and provide limitations on Beijing’s freedom of action if its activities are seen
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by Japan and its security partners as disrupting regional stability. Closer ties also
mean increased avenues for Tokyo to promote capacity building, thereby strengthen-
ing states’ abilities to stand up to China. Together, these promise Japan opportunities
to shape and expand its strategic space at China’s expense.
Nowhere is this truer than Japan’s efforts to create a unified understanding of mar-
itime rules. This has significant potential to constrain China because it chooses not
to handle territorial disputes multilaterally. Instead, Beijing prefers bilateral talks with
claimant states. Because Tokyo views SCS events as carrying precedence for its ECS
dispute with China, it tries to prevent Chinese success in SCS claims. Japan’s efforts to
unify regional states around its interpretation of UNCLOS make it difficult for China
to deal bilaterally with claimant states, thereby limiting China’s room for bargaining
and ability to engage in divide-and-conquer tactics.
Militarily, Japan’s efforts minimize China’s quantitative superiority and growing
technological gains. Internal balancing increases Japan’s ability to defend against “gray
zone” contingencies and limit China’s freedom of action in the ECS. New assets and
posture enable Japan to better monitor Chinese maritime activities and deny China
from gaining sea control in the ECS. Importantly, SDF enhancements improve Japan’s
ability to withstand – and potentially halt – a small-scale contingency. The acquisi-
tion of F-35s and next generation torpedos even indicate the potential to go toe-to-toe
with China’s J-20 fighter and launch crippling strikes against large vessels, such as
China’s aircraft carrier. Importantly, the development of amphibious capabilities com-
plicates China’s ability to hold islands. Although Japan’s amphibious capabilities are
still in their infancy, continued SDF participation in exercises like Dawn Blitz means
maturation may not take long.171
Finally, Japan’s external balancing with the US improves the alliance’s deter-
rence capabilities. Improved jointness increases interoperability and flexibility that
strengthens the alliance vis-à-vis China. Advancements in Japan’s BMD capabilities
coupled with closer BMD cooperation with the US potentially compromises China’s
Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities. And more advanced US assets in Japan counter-
balance China’s modernization efforts. Together, this enhances the alliance’s combined
capabilities, thereby ensuring military superiority.
Conclusion
Growing uncertainty over China’s intentions stemming from what Tokyo views as
increasing assertiveness has led Japan to alter its approach to China as a means to
expand its strategic space that has contracted due to China’s rise. Consequently, Japan’s
approach has evolved over the past 40 years from an engagement strategy toward a
harder hedge that today includes external and internal hard balancing, soft balancing,
and reduced economic ties. This is different from anything Japan has ever done and is
much more multi-dimensional than often given credit. The consequence is that while
Japan continues to pursue robust trade with China, the relationship today is much
more competitive and fraught with tension. Importantly, Japan is now in a position
to complicate China’s freedom of action and frustrate its continued rise.
Japan’s efforts are noteworthy because they are not what we would expect. Despite
power disparities and a reputation as a reactive state, this article shows that Tokyo has
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taken increasingly proactive, independent efforts to expand its strategic space and shape
its environment in ways conducive to its interests. At the same time, Japan is neither
buckpassing nor seeking independence from the alliance. Quite the contrary, Tokyo is
building up its own defenses, initiating new strategic partnerships, and strengthening
ties with Washington. In fact, it is only with a strong alliance that policymakers feel
confident to explore new partnerships.172
Japan’s move toward a harder hedge will continue. Not only have the changes been
bipartisan, as noted above, there is a pervasive view throughout Tokyo that Japan “has
been pushed enough and too long” by China and that Japan will no longer tolerate
this.173 This has led to the strong belief that Tokyo needs to be more proactive in shap-
ing Japan’s strategic future against an increasingly assertive China. As long as China
engages in behavior that Tokyo views as threatening to Japanese interests, this belief
will not weaken. In fact, there are already signs that Tokyo is increasing its proactive
efforts. In addition to strengthening the partnerships outlined in this article, Tokyo is
forging new strategic ties with Sri Lanka, Oman, and Malaysia and strengthening polit-
ical ties with all ASEAN states. Importantly, with Japanese public opinion of China
continuing to decline, support for harder hedging policies will remain.174
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